靳厚忠1，周腾军2，张文健3
(1.中央财经大学 体育经济与管理学院，北京 102206；2.西南财经大学 体育与经济管理研究中心，四川 成都 611130；3.温州大学 体育与健康学院，浙江 温州 325035)
摘 要：中国足球协会定位于兼顾“协助政府”和“服务会员”的双重目标，但实际上更多的是代表政府实施对职业联赛的纵向监管，导致中超联赛内部治理结构和俱乐部保护机制严重缺失。针对这一问题，研究基于激励性规制的理论框架，提出以下建议：一是提升俱乐部的自主权，构建涵盖多方参与的决策机制，强化应对足协纵向约束的抗衡势力；二是降低足协的行政职能与领导权威，使其致力于协调政府与俱乐部的目标一致性；三是从命令性规制转向激励式规制，推动政府从行政管理者向市场规制者的角色转变，使其更好地介入联赛治理、促进政府与市场主体良性互动；四是合理使用交叉补贴等激励性政策，完善职业联盟内部的自我治理机制。
关 键 词：中国足协；职业足球联赛；纵向约束；控制权缺失
中图分类号：G80-05 文献标志码：A 文章编号：1006-7116(2025)02-0047-07
Regulation dilemma and breakthrough path of Chinese Super League under the vertical constraints of Chinese Football Association
JIN Houzhong1，ZHOU Tengjun2，ZHANG Wenjian3
(1.School of Sport Economics and Management，Central University of Finance and Economics，Beijing 102206，China；2.Center of Sports Economics and Management，Southwestern University of Finance and Economics，Chengdu 61130，China；3.School of Physical Education，Wenzhou University，Wenzhou 325035，China)
Abstract: The Chinese Football Association is positioned to balance the dual goals of "assisting the government" and "serving its members," yet in practice, it primarily represents the government in implementing vertical supervision over professional leagues, leading to significant deficiencies in the internal governance structure and club protection mechanisms of the Chinese Super League. To address these issues, this study proposes the following recommendations based on an analytical framework of incentive regulation. At first, enhancing the autonomy of clubs by establishing a decision-making mechanism involving multiple stakeholders, thereby strengthening the countervailing power against the vertical constraints of the Chinese Football Association. Secondly, reducing the administrative functions and leadership authority of the Chinese Football Association, enabling it to focus on reconciling the goal inconsistencies between the government and clubs. Thirdly, shifting from command-and-control regulation to incentive-based regulation, facilitating transformation of the government's role from an administrative manager to a market regulator, and thereby enabling it to better intervene in league governance and promote positive interactions between the government and market entities. Fourthly, utilizing incentive policies such as cross-subsidies appropriately to improve the self-governance mechanisms within the professional league.
Keywords: Chinese Football Association；professional football league；vertical constraints；loss of control right